

DC 202

.7

.S6





AN
APPEAL
TO THE
NATIONS OF EUROPE
AGAINST THE
CONTINENTAL SYSTEM :

PUBLISHED AT STOCKHOLM,
BY AUTHORITY OF BERNADOTTE,
IN MARCH, 1813.

BY
MADAME DE STÄEL HOLSTEIN.

LONDON :
PUBLISHED BY J. M. RICHARDSON, CORNHILL.
BOSTON :
RE-PUBLISHED BY SAMUEL H. PARKER,
Union Circulating Library, No. 3 School-Street.

1813.



DC 209
.7
.56

PREFACE

TO THE

AMERICAN EDITION.

WE have seen an *obscure Corsican* ascend the *throne* of the *BOURBONS* ; and demand in marriage the *first princess* of the proud and ancient *House* of *AUSTRIA*. We have seen him subdue the strength and mind of all the continent of *Europe*, and compel its inhabitants to feel his power in whatsoever they could do, or abstain from ; and in whatsoever they could dread, or hope for.

His daring aggressions have at length roused and directed the spirit of the *North*. The flood of conquest seems to have rolled backwards to its source. The rescued nations again rise, and are permitted to hope. Confiding in the *illustrious ALEXANDER*, they encounter all that remains of fraud, and force, to *Napoleon*. The fields of *Germany*, so often crimsoned in the wars of usurpation, and fanatic zeal, are now to receive the torrents of the conflict between relentless despotism, and the liberties of the world.

Madame de Stael, by the authority of *Bernadotte*, has attempted to animate the friends of liberty, and of national rights in their fateful struggle. No one is better qualified to accomplish this purpose. She has watched the calamities of revolutionary and Imperial France, and has deplored the degradation of Europe with the philosophy of the other sex, and the sensibility of her own.

It is true, that a thousand leagues of ocean are between us and the Eastern Continent ; yet no people should feel a deeper interest in the events, which are there taking place, than ourselves. It is *Napoleon*, who has drawn our country into his crusade against *human nature*. It is *he*, who compels us to exhibit the melancholy spectacle of a people abandoning peace, prosperity, and honor, for war and wretchedness. It is for *him*, that our thousands have perished by the sword, by pestilence, or famine—that American commerce has ceased—that civil war commenced—that our territory is violated—that a *servile* war is probable—that we and our posterity must wear the shackles of *debtors*, if not of *slaves* ; and all these things are done without a more impervious veil, than the pretence of protecting aliens against their sovereigns, who claim the allegiance of birth.

Those, who have been the weak or wicked instruments of *Napoleon*, will continue to palliate and pursue their course of folly, or of crime. Let no man console himself that the end of evil days approaches. The *Russian Embassy* is conceived in the spirit which dictated the intercourse with *Rose* and *Erskine* ; with *Jackson* and *Foster* ; or if with better spirit, *Great Britain* has already suffered all that American hostility seems likely to inflict ; and will be henceforth careless of *America*, and of HER WAR.

No hope remains of escaping from our miseries, till the people shall have learned *who among their servants are the responsible authors of them*, or until the ARCH FIEND of *Europe* shall have fallen.

July 24, 1813.

PREFACE.

GREAT events have recently followed each other in such rapid succession, that the face of Europe has been changed within the short period which has elapsed since the following pages were begun. If this change had been of a different kind, the facts, hereafter detailed, would not be less authentic ; but many of my readers, perhaps, would not in that case regard the consequences which I have drawn, as convincing. The immutable principles of justice cannot be altered by events ; nor can the clouds, which occasionally obscure the sun, extinguish his glorious light. But success is an argument of marvellous weight with the multitude. If Napoleon had succeeded in concluding at Moscow the peace which he flattered himself he should be able to dictate, politicians would not have been wanting to inform us that his demands, previous to commencing the campaign, were founded on justice and moderation, and to condemn the imprudence of Russia in not yielding to his wishes : but Napoleon has been unfortunate

in an unjust aggression, and this is unpardonable even in the eyes of his apologists. The infallibility of his fortune is dissipated—his reputation, as a great captain, is shaken, and none but a hired sycophant, would risk the assertion that, in the recent campaign, he has shewn the foresight even of an ordinary general. A great blow has been struck at his power ; but he has survived his defeats ;—he has escaped alone, leaving his soldiers in the midst of every imaginable horror : he proclaims himself in good health, when, for the honour of humanity, he ought to feign the agonies of chagrin and remorse. His physical strength is annihilated, but in imposture he redoubles his efforts. To supply the place of the artillery which he has lost, he now thunders from the journals,—he speaks emphatically of the grand army,—he declares it to be victorious, when it is no longer in existence. This army, the most numerous and the best equipped which had been seen for many centuries, cannot now furnish a single human voice to accuse its leader, whose blind presumption occasioned the death of so many brave men : but the immense plains of Russia, and of Poland, covered with their frozen bodies, will cry aloud to after-ages for vengeance. Napoleon told us, that the defection of a general of the allies* called for enormous new levies.

* General D'Yorck.

Absurd proposition !—Fifteen thousand Prussians, who refused to fight for the continuation of the oppression of their native land, and of their sovereign, have been replaced by three hundred and fifty thousand Frenchmen ! —All France is depicted as eagerly rushing to arms, to defend a beloved monarch—alas ! so cruelly disturbed in his pacific career. He attempts to terrify the people by the ferocity of the Russian soldier : If we are to credit the French journals, the Russians are pouring forth from the depths of Asia, to introduce cannibalism into the civilized world ; it is thus that nurses frighten children with imaginary terrors. But, happily for mankind, the Russian soldier, terrible only in battle, is religious, obedient to his superiors, accustomed to discipline, and grateful for all the benefits which are conferred upon him. The French are frightened with the phantom of a dismemberment of their empire. But all the enlightened men in Europe, even in France itself, know well that nothing is wanted from France but the extinction of the spirit of conquest in her ruler. Let the French nation, after so many dire experiments, conform to these views. Let them confine themselves within their natural limits ; they have only to express a wish to obtain an honourable and solid peace, and to return to the enjoyment of all those advantages of which their ruler alone has deprived them.

The nations which have been subjugated by Napoleon have manifested their sentiments on this occasion in a most unequivocal manner. Their sovereigns have only to second the impulse given by the glorious example of Russia, to reassume their rights. The toils which we have described are coarse and worn out ; but there are more subtle artifices, against which they must be upon their guard : these are the intrigues resorted to in the courts of Europe, to amuse them by negotiations, to awaken their antient rivalships, to disunite the allies, and to detach them by deceitful offers from the true objects of the war. A profound historian has remarked, that “the great secret of despotism is to contrive, that each may see only his own individual interest, and that no one shall think of the public welfare.” It is with states, as with individuals : the secret of universal monarchy is to extinguish all zeal for the general welfare, by the calculating selfishness of every separate state. But let us hope that the public spirit of Europe will start up at so many powerful appeals, and the nations recover their independence !

APPEAL,

&c. &c.

UPON travelling through the provinces newly incorporated with the French empire, or those countries which have fallen under its sway, it is easy to perceive that the people have a very just sense of their situation. Unanimous expressions of regret for the past, complaints of the present, and anxiety for the future, are every where heard. There is no peasant so ignorant, as not to know who is the true author of the evils which overwhelm his country. There is not a cottage in Europe, however miserable and remote, where the name of Buonaparte has not been heard; for many centuries, no man has acquired such a dishonourable celebrity.

In France itself the public opinion, although radically the same, is manifested with more reserve and hesitation. In the first place, the language of the country places the inhabitants there immediately under the superintendence of the central police, to which foreign languages still present an obstacle. Besides, they compare their present condition, not with the tranquil times of the 18th century, but with the horrors of the revolution, which have effaced the remembrance of them. To the hopes, so frequently deferred, of a great reform in the social order, incredulity and apathy have succeeded. Many persons, perhaps of honourable minds, ascribe to Napoleon the restoration of order and tranquillity in the interior: they forget that the revolutionary horrors ceased long before his appearance, and that he succeeded to a government which was rather feeble and vacilla.

ting than oppressive. They threaten the French nation with the return of terror, if this man is not permitted to watch over their destinies. Strange sophistry ! By a chimerical fear, they think to convert into benefits the heaviest afflictions. Revolutionary terror marched boldly, with an uncovered front ; it provoked resistance, and, even from its very nature, could not endure long. The present is also a moment of terror, but it is a terror which palsies the courage, by disguising the danger. It is a *chef-d'œuvre* in the policy of Napoleon, to give an air of stability to a condition truly violent and insupportable.

Nevertheless, in France itself, the eulogies of Buonaparte are scarcely heard but from the lips of his slaves, the supporters of his power, and those who enjoy great personal advantages from him, and who would tremble for their personal security if he was overthrown. He is not now reduced, as at the commencement of his career, to purchase the silence of orators and journalists ; but he still pays very high for a good name : the *concertos* of high-flown praises, which he takes care to circulate from one end of his empire to the other, annually, cost his subjects many millions. The legislative body and the senate, the only remnants of republicanism, which he has allowed to subsist, have become, literally, mere courts of record. They are the imperial conservatories of flattery ;* there, amid the noisy uproar of bad rhetoric, they announce to the nation every burdensome law, every aggravation of imposts, every new levy of men from an exhausted population, every new war which desolates humanity, as a step towards universal pacification. But the people are deaf to these venal voices ; they disdain the purple of false glory, with which they seek to cover their misery ; they are profoundly indifferent to public affairs ; and all those who do not aspire to office, confine themselves to the circle of domestic life.

In preparing to develop the nature and consequences

* The school at Paris for the education of young persons intended for the theatre is called the Imperial Conservatory. Transl.

of the continental system, I should be almost ashamed to insist upon truths generally known, if there were not nations, among whom it is still possible to create delusion as to their true interests, because they have been hitherto but distant spectators of passing events ; and because they have not yet made the woful experiment of that system, or, in other words, of the dominion of Buonaparte. Of the whole European states, Sweden alone is in this fortunate predicament. She has suffered great losses, but she has preserved her independence : She has hitherto retained the liberty of choosing her political relations. The time may come when she will no longer have it in her power. The present moment is decisive for her liberty, her glory, and her future prosperity.

I shall abstain from drawing the character of that man whose success has astonished the world. Eloquence and declamation are useful only where it is necessary to excite the passions ; but, in the deliberate examination of a political subject, nothing ought to be exaggerated, and nothing advanced vaguely : the simple evidence of facts ought to be our guide. Whatever are the motives by which Napoleon is actuated ; whether by unbounded ambition, or by the imperious necessity of his situation, which admits of no recoil, the result of his actions is still the same. Admitting that he labours incessantly for the peace and happiness of the human race ; it must, nevertheless, be granted, that he does not comprehend the true method of attaining these desirable objects. Since he has held the reins of government, destructive wars have constantly raged, and the sources of public prosperity have been dried up wherever his influence has extended. Since, therefore, in spite of experience, he has for so many years adhered to the same maxims, it would be absurd to imagine that he will ever desist.

A short retrospect of the events which preceded the elevation of Buonaparte, with a sketch of the state of Europe at that period, will be sufficient to shew that he

seized upon the supreme authority, under auspices the most favourable for a pacific and conciliatory reign.

The wars provoked by the first effervescence of the revolution lasted but a few years ; a coalition, which embraced nearly the half of Europe, was gradually and silently dissolved. Prussia was the first to withdraw, in the spring of 1795, and gave peace to the north of Germany by her line of neutrality. Holland received, at the same moment, the form of government, and the conditions of peace, which were dictated by France. The kings of Spain, Sardinia, and the two Sicilies, followed the example of Prussia, and made a separate peace ; even Spain renewed her antient alliance with France. Several princes of Germany and Italy were compelled to purchase their repose at an exorbitant price, almost without knowing if they had really been at war with France. At length, in 1797, there remained no other combatants but England and Austria. England negotiated, and Austria concluded the treaty of Campo Formio : but the Directory speedily conjured up new wars. They attacked Switzerland, which had been respected even by Robespierre : they drove the king of Sardinia from the states which were left him on the continent of Europe ; they led the Pope into captivity, drove the court of Naples into exile, and divided Italy into petty republics : they consented to the expedition to Egypt, and thereby irritated Turkey, and afforded a new motive for war to England. All these aggressions, made in the course of a single year, broke the congress of Rastadt. Russia, which, till then, had dealt only in promises, at length seriously entered into the coalition, and the campaign of the allied Austrians and Russians in 1799 rescued the whole of Italy from the French armies, much more quickly than it had been conquered.

Never since the commencement of the war had the military situation of France been worse. The flatterers of Buonaparte had not failed to ascribe the salvation of the French republic to his return from Egypt : it has been his constant practice to appropriate to himself the

successes which were prepared for him by others. The revolutions which took place, even in the interior of the directory, had disorganised the armies, and caused their reverses. A man, who has since been called to higher destinies, by his genius and activity, succeeded, in a ministry of two months' duration, in reforming the disorders, the dilapidations, and abuses of every kind, which were at their height. The armies were reinforced, provided with every requisite, and, as it were, created again ; in this manner general Bernadotte secured, as a minister, the victories which he knew how to gain as a soldier. As a consequence of the re-establishment of the armies, the English were driven out of Holland ; Massena resumed the offensive in Switzerland against the Russians, and Moreau made head against the Austrians in Italy, before Buonaparte had done any thing more for the republic than to seize upon the supreme power.

As the Emperor Paul had assisted Austria from motives of generosity, he abandoned her from caprice : once more thrown upon her own exhausted resources, the brilliant successes of Moreau and Buonaparte, in 1800, constrained her to sign the treaty of Luneville at the beginning of the following year. England, after the cession of Belgium, having lost all hopes of preserving this province for Austria, in pursuance of the dictates of her maritime interests, tranquillized by her victories in Egypt, and the consequent security of her eastern possessions, consented the following year to the most extraordinary peace which was ever made after such a war. Always victorious at sea, always the conqueror in the East and West Indies, she recognized all the robberies of France in Europe, and gave back nearly all her own conquests in the other three quarters of the globe without any compensation.

The fate of arms in the wars terminated by this general pacification had often varied, but in the end the result was advantageous to France, beyond even the most extravagant hopes of her partisans ten years previous.

She had acquired the countries of Avignon and Venaisin : In Italy, Savoy, Nice, and Monaco ; Geneva, Muhlhausen, and the Bishopric of Basle, were torn from Switzerland. In Germany, all the states of the Rhine from Alsace and Lorraine to the frontiers of Holland ; the Austrian Low Countries, with Dutch Flanders, and the other possessions of the united provinces connected with it ; she had the mouths of the Scheldt, the Rhine, Mount Jura, and the Alps, for frontiers. This immense aggrandisement, which increased by almost one-fourth the population of the antient kingdom, was not the most important of the advantages which she acquired. The military consideration of France, which had fallen in repute under the latter reigns, had risen to an equal if not to a greater height than it had been in the days of Lewis XIV. Spain was also attached as firmly to the French republic as she had been to the monarchy. The new governments of Holland, Switzerland, and Cisalpine and Ligurian republics, were entirely devoted to the power which had created them, and without which support they would have dwindled into nothing. These republics formed so many bulwarks around the Mother Republic. In a word, France had all that was requisite for her glory, the completion of her wishes and security for the future ; her preponderance on the European continent was such, that it became doubtful from that moment whether any system of equipoise could exist, or if there was any other guarantee against her universal empire than her own moderation.

Ten years of fruitless experiments had disheartened the antient governments from any attempt to repair their losses. War, since the revolution, had assumed a character totally different from that which it bore in the former century. It was, what had never been in Europe since the extinction of the religious wars, a war of opinion. But, in the wars occasioned by the reformation, the two parties were inspired by an equal degree of enthusiasm, one for the defence of the established religion, and the other for that of the new doctrines. In the wars of the revolution, on the contrary, that moral elasticity

which is inspired by an implicit faith, was manifested only by the republican warriors ; while the troops of the antient governments fought as usual from motives of duty, and as a point of honour. Those who governed France could, in the name of liberty, command immense sacrifices ; they had the entire disposal of persons and property. The governments of the coalitions had only their usual resources, and even these they were obliged to manage with caution, lest they should augment the dangerous fermentation which threatened their states with the most violent explosions. The abolition of all abuses, the reign of justice, reason, and humanity, were the boons promised by France, at first to her own people, and which she afterwards held out to the universe. The people every where believed, therefore, that the time was come when they were to be released from all their troubles ; every where philanthropists, badly versed in history, and superficially acquainted with human nature, dreamed of a new golden age ; every where intriguers, under the mask of philosophy, played the parts of demagogues. The governments, which had hitherto been considered as the most free, were described as despotic, merely because they were sanctioned by long duration. The known excellence of a constitution, which had stood the test of ages, did not save it from a revolutionary storm. Not only were Holland and Switzerland convulsed,—not only did the disaffected Irish conspire to deliver up their country to France ; but in England itself there existed a faction which boldly announced the project of submitting the constitution to the crucible of theory. And, what was most formidable, chimerical ideas and real passions every where produced a similar delirium, at whatever period they burst forth for the first time. Although France had returned from her first errors, every new republic began precisely at the same origin. Long after the chief actors in the great drama of the revolution in France had disappeared from the scene, in Italy and Switzerland democratic puppets strutted about on their Lilliputian stages, to perform the hacknied parts of republicans. In

short, the revolutionary opinions of the age seem to have been to nations what contagious diseases are to individuals ; each carries their germ about with him, and must go through all their stages before he can be radically cured.

In addition to this popular opposition which the sovereigns had to encounter, the events of the last ten years unveiled the inherent vices of coalitions, and disclosed their insufficiency to meet such extraordinary circumstances. The cabinets which maintained the ancient laws of nations in Europe also retained their old prejudices. They thought that the perfection of diplomacy consisted in *finesse* ; they would have been ashamed not to have always some mental secret reservations behind, or not to have an eye to ulterior objects beside that for which they openly laboured. The system of equilibrium demanded from all nations mutual vigilance ; petty shifts, resorted to in order to disguise views of aggrandisement from other powers, were, to a certain degree, innocent in the peaceful era which preceded the revolution, as they could never go great lengths. Every thing was changed ; and yet there was no possibility of convincing statesmen of the fact, that a disinterested, open, and generous policy, could alone save the independence of Europe. The successes of one of the allied powers excited the jealousy of the rest ; the reverses which befel one in particular were regarded with indifference, nay, with satisfaction, by antient rivals. They approached each other coldly, and separated with disgust.

The antient governments of the continent, which kept their ground in spite of the double shock of French invasion and republican principles, had, therefore, the greatest interest in the maintenance of peace, and the greatest aversion from war. For three years none of them could bring themselves to the resolution of re-commencing it, although Buonaparte, as we shall see, gave them every provocation.

On the one hand, France had great reason to wish for peace with England. Her colonies were wrested

from her, or rendered useless, her national manufactures and her commerce were ruined ; in fact, the solemn acts and decrees of her own legislature had contributed as much to her misfortunes as the maritime war. Nevertheless, as the naval power of France had constantly decreased since the war ; as the navies of Holland and of Spain, since they became her allies, experienced nothing but reverses, a long repose at sea was the only method of repairing these losses.

In spite of all this, the peace of Amiens lasted only a year. The negociations which preceded the rupture are known to the whole world ; they bring to our recollection the observation of an antient historian, that we ought carefully to distinguish between the true causes of a war, and its pretexts, or alleged motives. The restoration of the sterile rocks of Malta to the order of St. John, exacted on the one hand and refused on the other, seems of itself to have been too insignificant an object to counterbalance the evils and the dangers of a war between two powers so formidable in every respect. But ulterior views presented themselves in the occupation of this island. England wished to secure a station in the Mediterranean, in the event of her ships being again excluded from the ports of Italy ; her ministers suspected the projects of Buonaparte upon Egypt and the Levant, for both of which Malta was the requisite place of rendezvous. We shall not decide, whether England was right in point of form in maintaining that she had only promised a conditional evacuation ; she was at all events right in the essentials of her conduct. It has been remarked, that the English government, after glorious and successful wars, has frequently made a bad peace, and that great haste has been made in repairing the imprudence committed. Hence it was easy to perceive, that the dangers of England consisted not in war but in peace ; that Buonaparte considered the latter as an useful respite to augment and exercise his navy ; that if England prevented him, he would call forth the immense resources of France and her dependencies, with all the energies of absolute power ; and, with that pro-

digious activity of disposition which is peculiar to him, that he would thus create, in a few years, a maritime force capable of keeping the seas against that of England, who would then see her territories threatened with invasion.

The projects of Buonaparte were but problematical as to their ultimate success ; but his actions, during the short interval of peace, were more than sufficient to justify the resumption of hostilities on the part of the English government. Buonaparte has always boasted of his moderation in making peace, and, to a certain extent, he is entitled to his merit. It is, in fact, one of the most artful calculations in this policy. Conditions, too severe, might drive an adversary, when half crushed, to the resolution of perishing in the contest, a resolution in which alone there is any thing like security from such an enemy. But when a government, after serious misfortunes, has regained a situation somewhat supportable, the remembrance of past dangers, and the conviction of its weakness, induce it to consent to every thing which does not immediately affect its existence. Thus Buonaparte reserves the richest harvests from his wars for the period of peace. The instant that the arms of the soldiers are grounded, (we allude to those of his enemy, for he never grounds his own,) he proceeds to acts which, in some way or other, extend his dominion. He seems to say to each of the states, which are opposed to him without success, " You are too fortunate in being permitted to enjoy tranquillity ; take care how you interfere in the affairs of another, with the exception of what I left you by the last treaty ; all the rest of Europe has fallen to my share, and the most trifling opposition to these my incontestible rights, will be regarded as a declaration of war." The continental powers understood this language well. In order to purchase a short respite, they suffered, without murmuring, Buonaparte to accumulate new means of aggression, and were crushed successively : Such has been the history of the last ten years.

England was far from acquiescing in this principle of perpetual aggression ; she protested against the occupa-

tion of Piedmont, Parma, and Plaisance, and the Isle of Elba ; she considered the prolonged stay of the French garrisons in Holland, and a new mission of troops to Switzerland, as attacks upon the independence of these republics, guaranteed by the treaty of Luneville. As to Holland, the foresight of the British ministry was fully justified by posterior events. After having long harassed the Swiss, the first consul, at length, gave them a constitution, nearly as good as any which they could have made for themselves ; but he wished that they should receive it from his hands, and he assumed the title of Mediator of Switzerland, as if he had prevented a civil war ; whereas, the whole nation was unanimous against the Helvetic government, instituted by the French Directors. The Valais was, from that moment, detached from the confederation, occupied by soldiers, and marked out to be incorporated with France, which has since been effected.

Whatever was the origin of this second war, England continued it for nearly ten years, with increasing success, earned by an heroic perseverance, which future historians will duly appreciate, when they contrast it with the submission of twothirds of Europe. England was in fact, the only enemy before whom the star of Napoleon lost its brightness ; it was England which sunk his fleets before Aboukir and Trafalgar, and which arrested the course of his conquests in Egypt, Sicily, Portugal, and Spain.

Buonaparte, in the first instance, resorted to his old project of a descent. He expended enormous sums, and persisted in his preparations for two years, desisting from the enterprise only when he was convinced of its absolute impracticability. After so many pompous proclamations, even *he* would have been greatly embarrassed how to apologise for quitting his camp at Boulogne, without having effected any thing, if the war with Austria had not furnished him with a pretext. England derived from these demonstrations the advantage of having fortified her line of coast, which a too great confidence in her wooden walls had made her neg-

lect. A descent could not be effected, but under the protection of a fleet, capable of coping with the English squadrons in the channel ; and, after many severe checks, the French flag had almost disappeared from the ocean. The superiority of the British navy, in numbers and discipline, is such, that their enemies think they have gained a triumph when one of their squadrons escapes along shore from one port to another. In vain did Buonaparte, at the commencement of the war, dispose of the ports of France, Holland, and Spain ; in vain did he afterwards take possession of those of Italy, Dalmatia, and of the north of Germany ; in vain did he construct ships of war in old and new dock-yards ; in vain did he establish a maritime conscription : so long as the English continue the war, without interruption, and blockade all the most important ports, they have nothing to fear ; French seamen cannot be trained, for want of experience ; and these immense preparations are mere schools for swimming on dry land.

The armament, of course, could do no harm to England in the European seas. After the first years of the war, in the other parts of the world, privateers were not to be found, because France had no colonies ; she had lost, in succession, not only all her own, but even those of Holland, which seemed to be the farthest removed from any attack.

Buonaparte was reduced, therefore, to make war of a description purely negative upon the trade and navigation of England, by excluding her ships and merchandise from the ports of France, and of the countries under her control. He had preached this doctrine so early as 1800, as an infallible method of forcing England to sue for peace upon conditions which should annihilate her naval superiority ; but he was not then powerful enough to refuse all toleration of neutrals. In 1806, he published the famous Berlin decree, and, since he has never ceased to execute, with increased vigour, what he calls the Continental System. He declared that the prohibitory regulations, which he thought proper to impose on his own subjects, were binding on all the gov-

ernments of the European continent ; and he left them no choice but to break off all commercial intercourse with England, or to be treated as the enemies of France ! I shall point out the injustice, the absurdity, and the ruinous effects, of this system, after having rapidly traced the progress of the wars which, since 1790, have not ceased to desolate Europe.

During upwards of four years, from the date of the treaty of Luneville, the peace of the continent was not disturbed. Its long duration would excite our astonishment, if we did not reflect on the immense labour which Buonaparte had to accomplish in the interior. He had the address to unite, in his own person, the double inheritance of the French republic, and of the old monarchy ; but he could only gradually enter into full possession. It was necessary to rivet his authority, to discover and punish conspiracies, amalgamate the fragments of all parties, and, by rewards offered to all, to compound them into one common mass of servility. There still existed something like public opinion in France : it was necessary, if we may use the expression, to veer round the human mind, and to steer it in a direction opposite to that which it had hitherto preserved in the midst of storms ; all which demanded complicated manœuvres. After having effected a counter-revolution in affairs, it was necessary to make one in words, also ; and republicans, the zealous defenders of the most arbitrary authority, exercised by liberty and equality, revolted at the very name of king. Buonaparte took care to sink this title in that of emperor ; but, in order to produce a certain awe and reverence, he had recourse to the usual trappings of royalty. There was a general resurrection, therefore, of what was supposed to have been buried for ever : the titles, ceremonies, customs of the court, decorations, even the superannuated phrases, which kings only made use of in their letters, were dragged from their musty repositories ; and, after many fleeting constitutions, France received, as her only permanent constitution, the *imperial etiquette*.

Amid these domestic occupations, Buonaparte neglected nothing which could advance his interests in other countries. He put the pacific dispositions of Austria and Prussia to the severest trials : a slight chronological sketch of all the acts of violence which he committed during the peace, will shew who was the real aggressor.

In September, 1802, an order from the first consul stripped the king of Sardinia of the states which still remained to him in Italy, and a *senatus consultum* ordered the definitive union of Piedmont and France. In the month of October, upon the death of the infant duke, the duchies of Parma and Plaisance were united in the same manner : Buonaparte pretended to act upon a cession made secretly by the court of Madrid long previous ; * but this cession was null, because Austria had eventual rights to these duchies, on the extinction of the branch of the Bourbons, who were invested with it.

By these acquisitions, France extended beyond the Alps part of the neutral limits, which she had solemnly prescribed to herself in order to tranquillize Europe.

In 1803, in the months of May and June, immediately after the maritime war had again broken out, Buonaparte marched a *corps d'armee* into Germany, occupied Hanover, and seized upon the administration. George III. had declared war, as King of Great Britain, and not as Elector of Hanover. He had not drawn a single man from his hereditary states in Germany to serve against France. The latter, in the American war, had never thought of attacking Hanover ; Frederick the Great never would have suffered it. Prussia, who had guaranteed the north of Germany during the whole of the war of the revolution, was particularly interested in not admitting a French army into the heart of her states : the Hanoverian minister demanded her protection, but was refused.

* This cession was probably made by the treaty of St. Ildefonso which has not been published—It is confirmed by another treaty made at Madrid, March 21, 1810. Trans.

The invasion of Hanover was a manifest violation of the peace with the German empire. The Emperor Francis II. as the head of Germany, was, therefore, called upon to oppose it, to declare the Empire at war, and to repel force by force, if protestations were in vain : but Austria took no part whatever.

England, seeing that the neutrality of the Empire was not respected, in a just spirit of reprisal blockaded the Elbe and Weser.—Germany, thus abandoned by the two powers who alone could protect her, became the theatre of hostilities by sea and land.

In March 1804, Buonaparte caused to be seized, by a detachment of troops, the Duc d'Enghien, upon the territory of the Elector of Baden. I shall not regard this atrocity here in any other light than as an infringement of the peace. Even supposing that the descendant of the illustrious Conde could be a subject of Buonaparte, guilty of treason towards him, the latter ought to have addressed himself to the sovereign in whose states the duke resided and demanded him. If the observance of these forms had given the Duc d'Enghien time to escape, the intended object (that of removing a dangerous character from the vicinity of France,) would have been attained. Several governments, it is true, extend the guarantee of the personal security which they owe to the governed, to the extent of never delivering them up upon any pretext.—A stranger, once received into a country, cannot be pursued thither for any crimes committed elsewhere. Is it intended thereby to favour individuals unworthy of such protection?—By no means ; it is a noble privilege granted to the soil itself, as the law of asylum in temples, respected among so many nations, was a homage paid to the sanctity of the place. It is beautiful to say to all men : When even the most puissant monarch upon earth is your enemy, touch our hallowed frontiers, and you have no longer any thing to fear !

If an armed force had seized, in the pacific territories of Germany, any individual, however obscure and criminal, it would at all times have been an act of hostility

which demanded reparation ; but the circumstances of this catastrophe were so atrocious, that Buonaparte seemed thereby loudly to declare to the civilized world his contempt for the law of nations, and his intent to trample the human race under foot.

How striking the contrast between this barbarous conduct of Buonaparte towards the grandson of the great Conde, and the generosity of a general, a rival to the former, in military glory, but exhibiting in every other respect the most perfect contrast. The Duc d'Enghien came secretly to Paris during the summer of 1799 ; Buonaparte was then in Egypt ; the republican government had no longer any power, and the Bourbon party hoped to rise. The minister of war, General Bernadotte, then attracted the notice of all by the splendour of his name, and by that rapid decision on perilous occasions which is the true characteristic of men destined to perform a conspicuous part. The Duc d'Enghien communicated to him, through the medium of a common friend, his arrival at Paris, and at the same time offered him the sword of the constable of France, if he would assist in re-establishing the Bourbons on the throne. " I cannot serve their cause," replied Bernadotte, " my honour unites me to the French nation ; but since the descendant of a hero,—since a man has put himself in my power, no ill shall befall him. Let the Duc d'Enghien set out this instant ! for his secret in three days will no longer be mine, and I shall owe it to my country." It is thus that a heart truly magnanimous always finds the means of reconciling duties in appearance the most opposite.

Every effort would have been too late to save this unfortunate prince ; Prussia and Austria made none ; Sweden and Russia in vain exhorted the diet to resent the outrage upon the Empire. This affair of honour, upon which there ought to have been no deliberation, was feebly debated, and speedily passed over in silence.

By a *senatus consultum* of the 18th May, 1804, Buonaparte was proclaimed emperor ; this new dignity was

recognized without scruple by the courts of Vienna and Berlin.

In March, 1805, Buonaparte, who, since 1802, had been President of the Cisalpine republic, declared himself-King of Italy. All was over, therefore, not only with the independence of this republic, guaranteed by the treaty of Luneville, (which had never been any thing but nominal,) but even with its existence. The Cisalpine republic, according to the gazettes, committed this political suicide, as a consequence of excessive love and veneration for its benefactor ; it was easy to foresee that he would soon inspire the other republics within his reach with a love no less extravagant.

As the iron crown of the antient Lombard Kings had been dug up, it became also natural and proper, to renew the name of the kingdom of Lombardy. But the Cisalpine republic had already assumed the name of the Italian republic ; transformed into a monarchy, it required the appellation of the kingdom of Italy. This denomination, more vast than its object, seemed to have been chosen expressly with a view to announce to the states of Italy, which were still independent, their future destiny.

Austria hesitated to recognize Buonaparte as king of Italy ; and this was the principal cause of his irritation against that power.

In the month of June, Buonaparte annihilated the republics of Genoa and Lucca, and incorporated them with the French empire. If he had seized upon Piedmont, Parma, and Placentia, Genoa and Lucca, for the benefit of the Cisalpine republic, his procedure would not have been the less unjust ; but he would have at least gratified the wishes of the Italian patriots, who hoped for the regeneration of Italy by its union into one body. But, by incorporating these states with France, he shewed that he recognized no boundaries but his conquests, and that he wished to set up the chimera of universal monarchy.

The war broke out in the autumn of 1805 : From the foregoing observations it will be easy to ascertain if

there was any thing with which to reproach Austria, except her too long patience. It is curious to observe to what miserable shifts Buonaparte had recourse in his manifesto, (i. e. his discourse to the senate,) in order to give a colour to his aggressions. He imputes ambitious views to Austria; but the aggrandisements of which he complains must be sought for with a microscope. Besides, it must be admitted that Austria had made her acquisitions in virtue of antient constitutional laws, or by cessions. With a rare impudence or sarcastic derision he reproached her, among other things, (as a dangerous aggression upon Switzerland,) with having ceded Meinau, a small island in the lake of Constance; a place which none but travellers ever heard of, and the possession of which would have tempted no person but an amateur of picturesque situations to form an English garden.

At the commencement of the war, the French troops stationed in Hanover passed through Hesse to rejoin the grand army. The elector of Hesse offered the king of Prussia to oppose their passage, if he would support him; the wretched king of Prussia discouraged him: a few days afterwards these same troops passed through the Prussian states into Franconia. The king of Prussia, instead of flying to arms, negociated; suffered himself to be amused by assurances of friendship and fallacious promises, and obtained no satisfaction for the violation of his territory.

This short but disastrous war for Austria was terminated by the peace of Presburg. In that of Luneville she had obtained compensations for her lost provinces, although by no means equivalent: Now she was called upon to give up all her possessions in Suabia, the Tyrol, her great bulwark, the state of Venice and Venetian Dalmatia, without any other compensation than the archbishoprick of Salzburg, which a prince of the House of Austria already possessed.

At the beginning of the war, the princes of the Empire were at peace with France, but they were not her allies, nor could they be so in defiance of the emperor

of Germany and their co-princes, while there existed a Germanic constitution. Those of the north remained neutral, under the protection of Prussia; those of the south awaited events. Austria had marched troops into Bavaria; this indispensable measure for the defence of her most exposed provinces was adopted with the full consent of the elector, who demanded only that they should preserve towards him an appearance of neutrality, as the cabinet of Vienna has proved by the publication of the correspondence with the court of Munich. In a short time, Bavaria, perceiving that fortune declared for the French, ranged herself under their standard, and the princes of Wirtemberg and Baden followed her example. Then it was that the Germans devoured each other, not in a civil war, for they had no cause of quarrel, but solely for the interests of a foreign power. The German princes were seen making an impious war against their emperor, who had so often protected them against the invasions of France, by exhausting the treasures and population of his hereditary states. But they were richly recompensed: Buonaparte distributed among them the spoils of their benefactor: and although scarcely a king himself, he raised the elector of Bavaria and the duke of Wirtemberg to the dignity of kings.

However great were the losses which Austria experienced by the treaty of Presburg, they were nothing in comparison of those which followed. The court of Naples, forced for a long time to pay tribute to France, and to maintain her troops in support of this new coalition, made a feeble effort to shake off the yoke. Abandoned by their allies upon *terra firma*, exposed to all the fury of the conqueror, they had neither the means nor the courage to keep the field, and fled to Sicily; an asylum which the assistance of England had secured for them. Two brothers of Buonaparte, one in the month of March, and the other in the month of June, were declared kings of Naples and Holland. The territories of these kings were only separated by the form of the incorporation of the countries which were given to them from the French Empire. By a law promulgated at the same

time Buonaparte arrogated to himself an absolute tutelage over his brothers and other relations. In virtue of this law, the quality of prince-royal of the Napoleon dynasty implied a perpetual minority. The first duty of a king of this new creation was a servile obedience to his master. This crown, this radiant circle, with which Buonaparte wished to decorate the brows of his brothers or his allies, was but the last link of a chain of which he held the other end, and which he could draw tight at pleasure ; and the declamations of philosophers against kings, as *crowned slaves*, were literally verified.

The Germanic Empire was still recognised by the peace of Presburg. Buonaparte, however, always kept his armies in Germany, in order to defend all the outrages committed by princes of the Empire even against their fellow-states ; he encouraged the depredations committed by the strong upon the weak, and by the satellites of his power upon the loyal and patriotic subjects of their country. The plunder of the imperial cities, of the equestrian order, of the petty kings who were pacific, and, in general, of all those states who had neither the power nor the will to make war against France, served to cement the *confederation of the Rhine*, into which no prince could be admitted, unless he had plundered his neighbours. It was about this period that a German bookseller,* in the midst of this pretended peace, in the bosom of his country, was shot, by order of a French military commission, for having dared to publish that Germany was degraded :—a strange method of refuting his assertion !

In the month of August, there at length appeared an act, constituting the confederation of the Rhine. Laying aside the constitutional regulations, which were never executed, this was at bottom nothing but a mutual compact, by which Buonaparte guaranteed to the princes of Germany the usurpations made under his auspices : they, in return, gave up to him the lives and properties of their subjects, promising to assist him in

* Palm.

all the wars of aggression which he might still have in contemplation.

The members of the confederation annulled, of their own accord, their obligations to the Empire, in virtue of which they held their fiefs. The emperor of Austria acceded to this arrangement by resigning the dignity of electoral chief of the Empire, and all the rights which belong to it. The treaty of Presburg recognized these rights ; but, in order to maintain them, a new war would have been necessary. Prussia, since 1795, had separated her cause from that of the Germanic Empire, and had given the pernicious example of making a separate peace. The ecclesiastical princes, who alone were sincerely attached to the Germanic cause, had ceased to exist, in consequence of secularizations : among most of the other princes, the sacrifices of Austria for the Empire, during the long war of the revolution, had been rewarded only by ingratitude or coldness. The Austrian monarch, therefore, voluntarily laid down his ancient crown, admitted by all Europe to be the first in dignity, and which for five centuries had adorned the house of Hapsburg. It will ever be recollected with sensibility, that equity and a paternal solicitude for the oppressed signalized the last acts of the imperial authority. It was easy to blame the debility of the Germanic constitution while it still existed, but it required a sad experience to make known the full extent of the evils which its fall was destined to bring upon Germany and Europe.

The hour of Prussia was come : her king had been long plunged in a fatal infatuation ; his eyes were at length opened, but it was too late. He was incessantly told by his sycophants that his pacific disposition was the acme of political wisdom ; and he was persuaded that, by persisting in neutrality, he would finally obtain the management of the equilibrium of Europe : Buona-
parte was himself one of the most undisguised flatterers of this unhappy monarch when he called him his natural ally. Prussia was still entire : the secularizations had

amply compensated her for the loss of her provinces beyond the Rhine. Upon adding her share in the last partition of Poland, it will be found that she was stronger in population and in resources of every kind, than she had been since the days of Frederick. But the latter sovereign would have prevented instead of awaiting events ; he would not have regarded the politics of the south of Germany as indifferent to him ; he would not have permitted Austria to be cooped up within her hereditary states behind the Inn ; and, in concert with her, he would have constructed a barrier sufficiently strong to resist the overflowings of ambition.

The ruin of Prussia was chiefly owing to a false confidence in her former successes. During eleven years, her civil and military institutions had not been put to the test ; she had not perceived their insufficiency even after so many changes in Europe. In general, this is the danger with which neutrals are menaced—inactivity, during the great contests which bring into play all the energies of human nature, diminishes those of governments and nations. It has been said that neutrals ought to preserve their strength, because combatants are mutually exhausted. This is false reasoning ; the strength of nations consists far less in masses of men or rich treasures, than in the impulses which are given to them by patriotism and military honour.

The Prussian ministry proved but too plainly how far they were from thinking of any hostile project, by lending themselves to the most insidious propositions of the cabinet of St. Cloud. Overlooking the violation of her own territories, Prussia consented to cede provinces to which she had no title, and to receive in exchange the electorate of Hanover, which French troops had, in fact, occupied, but which the king of England had by no means given up. To sum up his duplicity, Buonaparte negotiated a peace with the British government, offering the restitution of Hanover, while, at the same instant, he invited Prussia to take possession of it. Thus, at the moment when he was about to fall upon her, he took care to embroil her with England. In order to

tranquillize her as to the confederation of the Rhine, he prepared to form a northern league with those German states, which were not yet comprehended in the former. But when the king of Prussia wished to put this league into execution, Buonaparte excepted from it the Hanseatic cities ; adding, that his tenderness for the independence of the people of the north would impose upon him the necessity of protecting all those who refused to confederate. In the mean time the French armies remained in Germany, and approached the Prussian frontier : the armaments, which were indispensable for Prussia to preserve her frontiers, were considered as hostilities ; war, therefore, burst forth in full fury.

The Prince of Hesse, afraid that his country would become the theatre of the war, requested the belligerents to allow him to remain neutral. His proposal was eagerly acceded to at the French head-quarters, and received with coldness by the king of Prussia. Fifteen days after having recognised the neutrality of this prince, Buonaparte, once more victorious, and having no longer any thing to fear, stripped him of all his states, aggravating his atrocity by the most odious imputations. A memorable lesson for neutrals !—the elector of Saxony, at first the voluntary ally of Prussia, afterwards turned his arms against her, without any reason but her misfortunes, and was recompensed with the title of king, and the duchy of Warsaw. Neutrality is a crime in the eyes of Buonaparte, because it is a demonstration of independence ; defection, on the contrary, deserves to be encouraged : besides, a line of conduct which depresses the dignity of a sovereign is always the beginning of an intimacy with that man who considers personal esteem as a constraint.

We are not writing the history of the wars of Napoleon,—we are rather sketching the history of his treaties. It will be sufficient to recal the immediate consequences of the peace of Tilsit. The foundation of the new kingdom of Westphalia for the Napoleon dynasty ; the accession of most of the princes of the north of Germany to the confederation of the Rhine ; the duchy of War-

saw, the nucleus of the future re-establishment of the kingdom of Poland, an useful engine in the hands of an adroit politician, and which he might turn at pleasure against Russia or Austria ; the re-establishment of the republic of Dantzic, whose independence was guaranteed, but whose subjection might easily have been foreseen, since it would furnish France with a port in the Baltic, and a strong *place d'arms*—finally, military routes reserved to the French armies through the Prussian states, so that in future no barrier should be interposed to their progress to the Russian frontiers,—such, in an evil hour, were the conditions to which the cabinet of St. Petersburg acceded !

This treaty was concluded in the summer of 1807 ; before the end of that year Buonaparte had seized upon two kingdoms, Portugal and Etruria ; and had entrapped Spain so firmly, that he thought himself secure of his prey.

The occupation of Portugal, a kingdom tributary to France since the peace of 1801, was founded upon the pretext of the admission of English vessels into her ports : while the French government endeavoured to tranquilize the Prince Regent, and to make him believe that the troops which had entered his kingdom were intended only to guard the coasts ; and that he should be always respected as a sovereign of Portugal, provided he committed hostilities against England ; the British government opened the eyes of the court of Lisbon to their true interests, and induced them to embark for the Brazils. Buonaparte then declared, in his oracular style, *that the House of Braganza had ceased to reign* ; but it happened quite otherwise. It would, indeed, have ceased to reign if it had remained, and would have been condemned to drag out a captive existence at the mercy of the usurper. The honourable flight of the court of Lisbon to another hemisphere proved that extremes are most proper to be resorted to with such an enemy. The day on which the prince of the Brazils set sail from Lisbon was the æra of a new splendour for that monarchy, formerly so victorious, but which had fallen into decay

for upwards of two centuries. The Brazils were improved by the residence of the court, by the riches and the new inhabitants which flowed into them : Portugal was reconquered for its legitimate sovereign by these very English, who are accused of abandoning their allies ; and the Portuguese troops, animated by a new enthusiasm, assisted in the deliverance of Spain, and will soon, perhaps, present themselves on the frontiers of France.

Spain, during eleven years; to her great loss, was the most faithful and devoted ally of France. The French government disposed as it pleased of the fleets, the army, and the treasures, of that monarchy. The court of Madrid carried its complaisance so far as to permit the troops destined for the invasion of Portugal to pass through Spain. This was the signal for its ruin. All the world knows by what machinations the royal family were, in the first instance, divided among themselves, afterwards cajoled towards Bayonne, and how an abdication was extorted from Ferdinand VII. who had no alternative allowed him, but to sign it or die. In this business the allies of Buonaparte ought to have foreseen the fate which awaited themselves, and from which the greatest zeal in his service and the most absolute devotion to his will can never save them. But this exterminating ally trusted in their illusions, in their pusillanimity, and, above all, in their precarious situation ; since, not only the kings of new creation, but also the antient confederate princes, had no other supporter but himself, their true and legitimate rights being swallowed up in their usurped titles. After the proceedings of Buonaparte in Spain, no person can flatter himself that he will confine himself to such robberies as are consistent with the interests of his domination ; he has shewn himself determined to sacrifice sovereigns and their subjects to the caprices of his vanity. For a long period Spain had been a kingdom held together for his benefit ; the government collected their resources from the people on his account alone. The whole of this immense possession, as convenient as it was profitable, he risked

to increase the glory of his dynasty ; to place a Buonaparte upon that throne, occupied, after the illustrious descendants of the Goths, by the houses of Hapsburg and Bourbon. Admitting that it was easy for him to mistake the true character of the Spaniards, it must at all events be admitted, that his enterprize was badly calculated in every respect. He ought not to have trusted that the nation in general would consent to a change effected by open violence ; besides the members of the royal family, who were prisoners in France, there existed several claimants to the throne of Spain. In order to support an intrusive king, he must have had a French army constantly in the peninsula, where the English could, from every harbour, pour in assistance to the disaffected. Besides, it was clear that the colonies would emancipate themselves on such an occasion, and that the gold of the mines of Potosi and Mexico would cease to flow into Madrid, and from thence to France.

But, what was most singular in the affair of Bayonne, was, that Buonaparte therein manifested his true opinions of the rights of the very people whose protector this *Republican Emperor* had so often declared himself. He treated the Spanish people as a herd of cattle, which their proprietor is willing to dispose of to the highest bidder. Even if the cession of Ferdinand VII. in favour of the Napoleon dynasty had been voluntary, it would have had no validity without the consent of the nation. There is a great difference between the property of individuals and political prerogatives. Hereditary sovereignty is a right purely personal, and consequently is not transmissible except in the established order of succession. If this order is broken by the extinction or exclusion of a reigning family, the nation only can dispose of the vacant throne. Certainly Buonaparte is powerfully interested in recognizing this eventual right of election ; for, by virtue of what other title but the shadow of a popular election does he lay claim to the sovereignty of France ?

It is nearly five years since the first insurgent inhabitants were massacred at Madrid : during these five

years, Spain has been the tomb of the French and allied troops ; she has also been the quicksand in which the treasures of Napoleon have been sunk, and her subjugation is at this moment as far distant as ever. This beautiful country, so highly favoured by nature, has been desolated to such a degree as to present in many places the aspect of a desert ; the flower of the Spanish youth has mouldered away, or languishes in sad captivity ; and all this that Joseph Buonaparte, who was already in tranquil possession of the throne of Naples, might (in spite of his own wishes) replace Ferdinand VII. on the throne of Spain ! Can it be doubted, that this young prince, whose faculties were benumbed by a confined education, if he had been permitted to reign, would have placed himself implicitly under the tutelage of his powerful ally, and that the latter, by directing his councils, could have reformed the abuses of the government, restored its antient prosperity to the Spanish nation, and made himself adored ?

After this recapitulation of events since the peace of Presburg, there is nothing particular to add, as to the causes of the last war with Austria in 1809. I shall not however refer to the Austrian manifesto such of my readers as are not yet convinced of the justice and necessity of this war. Among other inconveniences which attend treaties by which the legitimacy of the new French authorities is recognized, an almost insurmountable impossibility has arisen of drawing up a good manifesto. The pen of the diplomatist, as well as the sword of the warrior, was checked by the recollection of a too servile subserviency to existing circumstances. What was not without example, was not without probability ; and, the secret fear of being forced to repeat these submissions, imposed caution and silence. There was only one good manifesto left ; it consisted in throwing the gauntlet for a war of extermination, and in saying—“ In former treaties we have compromised our dearest interests, and sacrificed our most sacred duties : this man, whose usurpation we have recognized against our conviction ; whom we have permitted to sit among us,

legitimate sovereigns, is guided neither by laws nor by good faith. We appeal to the universe against him : Although far less powerful than him, we arm once more, because he leaves us no alternative but to await extermination at his hands, or to prevent it !”

It is easy to observe, that, since the revolution, every new war with France was commenced under disadvantages, infinitely greater than the preceding ; and, in proportion as the danger increased, hopes of assistance were diminished. Buonaparte took care to compromise more and more each power with its neighbour. Prussia had remained an indifferent spectator of the misfortunes of Austria, in 1805 ; in the following year Austria looked on, while Prussia was ruined. The small portion of Prussian Poland, which Russia received by the treaty of Tilsit, may be considered as a compensation for the expenses of the war. In 1809, Russia, pressed by France to take an active part in the war, made only a demonstration ; but at the peace she accepted a considerable portion of Galicia. In the recent campaign, both Prussia and Austria furnished contingents against her ; and, by contributing efficaciously to overwhelm her, prepared for themselves—God knows what destiny !

All that has been said as to the ruinous effects of neutrality, premature treaties and co-operations, more or less direct with France, has not for its object to blame the antient governments of Europe, for which we have the highest respect. Their situation since the revolution, and particularly since the usurpation of Buonaparte, has been, in fact, quite novel and truly embarrassing. The first shock of any great and unexpected reverse of fortune precipitated the conclusion of peace ; in order to preserve it, it was necessary to yield to Buonaparte in every thing : to have him for an enemy was to be in imminent danger ; his friendship is infallibly pernicious, but it is not so immediately ; and he neglects nothing to fascinate the eyes of those whom he caresses, while he meditates their ruin. It is to be wished that the continental powers would mutually grant an amnesty for all that has passed under this malignant influence, as

soon as one of them gives proofs that it sincerely wishes for its independence, arising out of the deliverance of Europe.

The Austrian government, in 1809, after making a solemn appeal to the patriotism of the people, shewed no perseverance. They were thereby deprived of the faculty of having recourse again to extraordinary means, and this cooling of the public opinion was a much more dangerous evil than the loss of some provinces. Austria lost, by the peace of Schoënbrunn, the frontier of the Inn, Salzburg, a portion of Gallicia, portions of Carinthia, Carniola, and Croatia : the latter districts, under the name of the Illyrian Provinces, were yielded immediately to the French Empire ; the remainder were presented to her allies. But what signified a district more or less, when the proportions were already so prodigiously altered between the two empires ? Even during the war, Napoleon incorporated the Ecclesiastical States with France, stripping the Church, which he affected to respect, and the venerable old man, who thought he had performed an embassy of peace, by placing the crown on his head. Soon afterwards he deposed his brother, the King of Holland, for not having been a good *Douanier* in the prohibitive system which reduced his subjects to beggary. The Dutch nation, formerly a model of republican virtues, victorious in the two Indies, the rival of England, was so humbled, that he dared to tell them in the face of Europe, that as they inhabited a country which was washed by French rivers, or such as had become French, they must, as a matter of course, be incorporated with France. This, I presume, was the first time that the hypotheses of geology were ever adduced as arguments in politics !

Subsequently he united the Hanseatic cities :—those republics, always pacific, long oppressed by France, which had sold them a momentary protection, at an exorbitant price ;—the shores of Germany, from the mouth of the Ems to that of the Trave ; and a great extent of territory in the interior, composed partly of the Hanove-

rian States of the King of England, and partly of those of other princes, against whom France never had the least cause of complaint. Two prefectures were even taken from the Kingdom of Westphalia, without the brother of Napoleon being apprised of it in any other way than by the decree inserted in the *Moniteur*.

Such, therefore, was this monstrous federal system, which was rapidly verging towards universal monarchy. Every other arrangement was only provisional ; the final term was always an incorporation with the Grand Empire. The same policy which guided Buonaparte in 1797, in Italy, in making and unmaking ephemeral republics, was now exercised on a larger scale and under despotic forms. The nations ranged under French controul may learn how highly they are rated in the eyes of the master of their masters, by reflecting on the language of Buonaparte to his young nephew, when he invested him with the Grand Duchy of Berg : “ Remember always, that your first duties are towards *me*, the second towards France, and the third towards the people entrusted to your government.” The example of the Bourbons dethroned in Spain, and of Louis Buonaparte stripped of his crown in Holland, teach all confederate princes that it is a fine thing to be a devoted ally ; that it is a fine thing to be connected by consanguinity to the new dynasty, which every thing contributes to preserve from the destiny which awaits human events ! The most highly favoured may at least expect from Napoleon the politeness of Polyphemus. Ulysses having presented him with some excellent wine ; “ My friend,” said the grateful cyclop, “ I shall eat you among the last of your companions ! !”*

After the last defeat of Austria, after the change effected in the political system of this power by the marriage formed between an Austrian princess and Napoleon, all hopes had disappeared that the Continent would throw off the yoke, while Prussia continued her alliance with France. Happily for the world, Buonaparte, blinded by his pride, committed a great error in break-

* Οὐτὶν ἐγὼ πνικτοῦ ἐδομαι μετὰ δις ἑταροῖσι. *Odyssey*, X. 370.

ing a peace which was so useful to him, and attacking that monarchy whose armed force had only fought as auxiliaries and at a distance from their own frontiers.

Thrice had Russia engaged in coalitions against France, and always in a disinterested and generous manner. Paul I. was disarmed by the flatteries of the Chief Consul ; it required a deeper hypocrisy to fascinate Alexander, a sovereign equally humane and magnanimous, who, since 1805, has been hailed by Germany as her future deliverer. Napoleon succeeded in persuading him that the obstinacy of the English in maintaining their maritime preponderance was the sole cause of all the misfortunes of the civilized world ; that France, having lost her colonies, her navigation, and the greatest part of her commerce, had been driven, in spite of her wishes, to aggrandisements ; that the sovereignty of the seas must be wrested from England, by vigorously excluding her ships and merchandize from the ports of Europe ; that, in this event, whatever was burdensome in the Continental System would cease of itself, and that all the branches of industry would take a new turn, while the general peace would be guaranteed by the union of the two preponderating powers.

For many years the declaimers and bettors against Buonaparte had foretold, as the result of his prohibitory measures against England, the stagnation of his commerce, the ruin of his manufactures, the misery of his people, public bankruptcy, insurrection, and the overthrow of his states. But all these predictions were not exactly verified. Buonaparte had of himself not a little damped these exaggerated hopes, by putting off this catastrophe for thirty years. However closely the coasts were watched by clouds of douaniers, it was discovered that a great quantity of English merchandize had slipped into the Continent and even into France. Domiciliary visits were made every where, colonial produce was confiscated, and the English manufactures were burnt. While these commercial *auto da fe's* were celebrated with ridiculous pomp, Buonaparte, in order to cover the deficiency of his finances, caused by the inac-

tivity of the douaniers, opened his ports himself by giving licences to the English vessels ; i. e. he seized upon all contraband trade as an imperial monopoly. Russia had therefore a right to complain that France was the first to break her engagements : she might have complained of a thousand other vexations : she contented herself with re-establishing under a neutral flag a feeble portion of her antient commercial relations after having for several years continued the enormous and fruitless sacrifice of her foreign commerce. To conclude, she awaited, in a calm and dignified attitude, the most impudent and atrocious aggression.

Buonaparte published no manifesto on the subject of this war : he relied too much on his good fortune to appeal to justice. Nevertheless, by his own confession, his only motive was the admission of English vessels and English merchandize into the ports of Russia. This dreadful conflict between the Russians, single-handed, on the one hand, and on the other a multitude of nations such as had not been seen for ages united under one flag ; of Germans and Italians of all denominations ; Dutchmen and Croats, already become French subjects ; Swiss, Portuguese, and Spaniards, torn from their country ; this devastaing war, which dragged the youths of Western Europe to the confines of Asia ; this holy league—Will posterity believe it ?—was announced to the world as a crusade against sugar and coffee, and muslins and laces ! Is the human race to be thus trifled with ? And how long will the most enlightened nations sacrifice themselves patiently, to amuse the ennui, flatter the vanity, and allay the ambition of a single man !

But, perhaps, it may be objected to all we have said, that, if the policy of France be oppressive, that of England is not less so, and that her maritime despotism is equally contrary to the welfare of other nations as is the spirit of conquest which animates the French government. Assertions, the most devoid of truth, incessantly repeated with assurance and inculcated with due emphasis, end in making an impression upon unthinking

minds, whose idleness reposes amidst vague ideas. We shall, therefore, examine what is signified by this cry of the *liberty of the seas* ; we shall prove that it has no direct meaning ; and that, if it is possible to tyrannise upon the ocean, it is not England, but France, which attempted it, so far as her maritime force would permit.

England, at present, possesses the greatest naval force which is ever been known ; in short, the navies of all other powers put together would not equal it. If this be an evil, it is one of those which have been brought upon Europe during the last twenty years ; for, in the American war, the united navies of France, Holland, and Spain, gave England abundance of trouble, and she respected the armed neutrality of the three maritime powers of the north, although it was extremely contrary to her interests. The equilibrium could only be restored by a peace, during which England disarmed, while trading-vessels alone composed the navy of other nations.

Supposing that there was an universal peace. No person ever accused the English, to my knowledge, of harassing, in time of peace, the navigation of other powers, however feeble ; no person has reproached them with not observing, towards their enemies, the laws of war, sanctioned among civilized nations. It is, therefore, upon their conduct towards neutrals alone that the question hinges.

In order to probe this matter to the bottom, we must not lose sight of the nature of a maritime war. It is undertaken chiefly for the interests of commerce ; it would become completely illusory, if it did not give permission to attack in all ways the commercial navigation of the enemy. It is this principle which has authorised the practice of seizing upon all the property of subject enemies, exposed upon the high seas, or even to destroy them, which, in wars upon *terra firma*, is deprecated as barbarous.

Of the two belligerents by sea, the weakest will always naturally favour neutrals, who can render them the most important services. Are her merchant-vessels

confined in port for want of a squadron to protect them ? the neutrals become her carriers ; they transport merchandize between the mother-country and her colonies ; and if they are requested, even between the two hostile countries ; and, after all, the subjects of the power which has recourse to them, only lose by this expedient the profits of the freight, retaining those of the trade itself.

There could not be a more lucrative situation than that of a neutral in a maritime war, if the belligerents were dupes to these pretended rights of neutrality, and put no restrictions upon them. Their ships would be wasted in fruitless cruises, if they did not now and then humble an enemy for the honour of the flag, and all the profits of the war would accrue to the states which had borne no share in the risk.

It is useless, in order to elucidate this subject, to go back to the principles of the law of nature, the decisions of which are often vague, without the concurrence of positive laws founded upon treaties ; but more particularly insufficient for relations of so complicated a nature as those of the commerce of civilized nations. The rights of neutrality can only be limited, therefore, by the conflict between the disadvantages of reciprocal negotiations, and those consequent upon, a rupture. It will be necessary for the belligerents, for instance, to ascertain if they ought to prefer the war in disguise which neutrals wage against them, to open war ; whereas, neutral states must consider whether it is their interest to subject their navigation to some constraint, or to expose it entirely.

To maritime belligerents the right is generally granted of preventing the importation of goods contraband of war into an enemy's port, and the rights of blockading one or more of his ports, which in cases of contravention justifies the confiscation of neutral vessels. No dispute has arisen as to the right to seize the property of an enemy in neutral vessels, and consequently to visit them and to blockade their coasts.

During the war with America, *armed neutrality* proclaimed the principal that "the flag covered the merchandize." England never recognised this principle, for good reasons. This claim, if pushed to extremities, would not only place belligerents, at the mercy of the neutral powers, so far as goods contraband of war are concerned, but would admit of troops being conveyed in neutral vessels for the invasion of an enemy's territory.

The blockade of a coast differs from that of a particular port only in the extent of the measure. If a power has the means of effecting it, why has she not the right also? If it is difficult to blockade a whole coast as vigorously as a single port, neutral vessels will enter and depart at their own peril.

Finding his shores blockaded, Buonaparte, by the Berlin decree, declared the British isles themselves in a state of blockade; as, in a quarrel, an insult is retorted on the person offering it. The English government may well despise this stupid menace, since it would require immense naval resources to realize it; and those which France possesses are almost useless. If it were an act of reprisal, it would only fall upon neutrals; and it was a violation of their rights, infinitely more atrocious than any thing that England had ever done. Buonaparte declared to all maritime states: "I have not a single ship of war at sea to prevent your vessels from visiting England; but, I forbid you to send them there. I cannot hinder English vessels from freely navigating the seas; but, I order you to exclude them from your ports. If you do not prohibit all intercourse with England, all is over with you: I shall attack you, nor shall I lay aside my arms until your coasts are guarded by my own douaniers."

This is not all. As there were maritime states which Buonaparte could not attack by land,—among others, America,—he made, expressly on their account, an ordinance, which bears: that, "After any neutral vessel shall have been visited by any English ships of war, and shall have touched, by their orders, at any English port, and paid duties there, her flag is *denationalized*;

and, wherever she is seized, she shall be declared a lawful prize."

In this way Buonaparte punishes neutrals, for the weakness which puts it out of their power to oppose the claims of the British government. As a motive for this outrage, he says that it behoves every state to maintain its own independence. Granted :—but it is a duty which she owes to *herself*, and not to *you* : Who gave you the right to call her to account ? Besides, no obligation is binding beyond a possibility.

From all that has been said, it results, that, if England sometimes handles neutrals roughly, Buonaparte never tolerates any whatever, and destroys, as far as lies in his power, even to the shadow of the rights of neutrality. The violence of his proceedings being such, while his ships are blockaded in port, what would his conduct be if he were powerful at sea ?

The French minister incessantly proclaims the liberty of the seas as the sublime object of the continental system ; it is the watchword for every new war. Nevertheless, in all the negotiations with England, this same minister has never paid neutrals the compliment of proposing any stipulation in their favour for the future.

For twenty years Europe has been deluged with declamations and calumnies against the British government : for ten years and more the journals and other political writings, published in England, have been contraband in France and in all the countries under her influence. Facts are disfigured by mutilated extracts from the opposition newspapers. If the new French catechism were to contain a lecture on the sacred rights of the Napoleon dynasty, one of the articles of their creed would be "*the English are the tyrants of the Ocean and the eternal enemies of the Continent.*" We have already refuted the first of these imputations ; the second will disappear upon examining the true relations of England with Europe.

The English are described as a nation of shopkeepers. This may be said in as much as commerce is one of the principal bases of their riches and their power ;

and, consequently, in public transactions, their government ought never to lose sight of commercial advantages ; but it is an arrant falsehood to say that commerce is their sole occupation, their only resource, and that no other materials enter into the admirable structure of their national prosperity.

The occupation of a merchant, on a limited scale, from incapacity or aversion to other pursuits, with a desire for gain disproportioned to the means of acquiring it, produces that mercantile spirit which is justly condemned as selfish, and contrary to a noble and disinterested nature. But, when commerce is conducted on a large scale, by a great and enlightened nation, whose social institutions are chefs d'œuvres of reason and experience, among whom the sciences and learning, the mechanical arts and agriculture, far from being neglected, are brought to perfection, in proportion as mercantile speculations become extended ; then commerce necessarily leads to liberal views and renders every citizen a cosmopolite. Not only in order to be flourishing do they require peace and liberty ; but a commercial people, as a matter of necessity, are interested that others should enjoy the same benefits. War takes off hands from the manufactories, while it consumes a quantity of produce ; it impoverishes, therefore, in general, the two belligerents ; at least one of them. Liberty, and the reign of equitable laws, to the exclusion of every arbitrary act, secure property ; and it is upon this security that public and private credit rest. Can we for a moment suppose that a commercial nation will rejoice in the oppression and ruin of those with whom they carry on trade ? They could no longer find any markets, for a poor country has nothing to sell, and has no money with which to purchase. Petty merchants may be jealous of each other, may wish to seize upon a monopoly, or grasp at merchandize, and use all means to succeed ; and the politics of some states have frequently resembled these vices of tradesmen. But such artifices cannot be profitable in the main : in commercial affairs of

states, as of individuals, nothing is durable but that which is voluntary in every sense of the word, and founded upon mutual advantages. When a nation has acquired a superiority in most branches of human industry ; when their navigation intrepidly visits every portion of the globe, and traverses the ocean as securely as the waters of a canal ; when the most valuable luxuries of all countries pour into their harbours as well as the first objects of necessity : when it possesses the art of multiplying one hundred fold the value of the latter, by fashioning them with durability, elegance, and perfection ; and when the perfection of mechanics, sparing manual labour, admits of their commanding for the productions of their manufactures a superior market ; then the whole progress of civilization, whether in extent or in rapidity, are so many augmentations of their capital. It is with the surplusage of productive labour over the consumption of the interior, that a nation procures foreign merchandize : and the more numerous the productions it has to receive, the more will it be able and willing to buy. A taste for the conveniences of life, the enjoyments of luxury, and of all the external embellishments of life, may be diffused among all classes, multiplied and varied *ad infinitum*. A nation which knows how to satisfy this taste in a thousand ways must add to the comforts of its own population and to the luxuries of others.

The experience of several years seems to have proved that England can subsist her population although shut out from the Continent, but not without submitting to privations. The other three quarters of the globe are more open than ever to her mercantile speculations, to her colonial establishments, and even to her conquests, if such were necessary to maintain her prosperity. We do not mean to say that European connections are not very important to England, but they are not so much so as formerly : a wonderful focus of moral and intellectual excellence has concentrated, within a space comparatively small, and little favoured by nature, a population the most numerous, the most active, and the most powerful, by the ascendancy of the human mind. But if, by

this frightful levelling, with which all states are threatened, the genius of national character is sunk into a mechanical uniformity, if the most insolent and illiberal despotism should plunge Europe into misery and into barbarism, there would only be a single corner of the globe from which it could be excluded : and England, remaining like the ark afloat in the midst of the universal deluge, will find ample compensation, in directing all her efforts towards those vast and rich countries of Asia, where civilization has become stationary from its antiquity : and towards others still unexplored in Africa, America, and the Pacific Ocean, where prodigal nature only wants the finishing hand of man. Let us not forget that there already exists an Europe beyond the seas : our languages, our manners, and our arts have been carried there : this American Europe is only in its infancy, because it has been neglected or badly administered : that part which has become independent has sprung up with astonishing rapidity. If there be not some happy change in store for our old world, the vigorous youth of the new, may speedily put to shame the aged decrepitude of the mother-country. In several countries confederated with France, projects of emigration towards the other hemisphere are treated as state offences, while the English government, by the wisdom of its laws, has in a few years transformed a place of transportation for criminals into a flourishing colony. Can we mistake the revolutions which are announced by those symptoms ?

So far is England from finding it her interest to ferment the troubles, and to perpetuate the dissensions of the Continent, that she is interested that Europe, after twenty years' convulsion, should finally enjoy peace,—a peace which shall be guaranteed by the stability of her governments, and the re-establishment of the barriers of the independence of every state. Let it not be said, that the English minister pursues a line of policy separate from the interests of the nation : that is rendered impossible by the British constitution, by virtue of which the government must always give way to the

wishes of the enlightened majority. England continues the war at the expense of immense sacrifices ; she may purchase peace with a stroke of the pen, by subscribing to the new system of the oppression of the public law of Europe. The greatest disappointment would be suffered by those powers which are still in the field, and by those nations which by their own princes have been forcibly chained to the chariot-wheels of the usurper. England continued adverse to every project of conquest in Europe, notwithstanding the allurements which presented themselves : she has been always faithful to her engagements, and always zealous in succouring such of her allies as remained true to themselves. As she ought to have done, she has, in the first place, fought for her own safety : but it must be at the same time admitted, that she has fought with a noble enthusiasm for the common cause.

The ministers of Buonaparte, like official defenders of the general anathema against English commerce, maintain, that he ought to take advantage of his internal commerce, and improve his agriculture and manufactures ; they say, that England herself has prohibitory laws against the importation of foreign commodities. It must be in the first place remarked, that exportation is also annihilated by the Continental System, since that of England is interdicted by the decrees of blockade, and there is no navy to protect the remains of the navigation of those countries which are in a state of hostility against her. The carriage by land of goods to great distances is so expensive, that it amounts to a prohibition of many productions ; and the canals, which ought to supply the want of external navigation, as yet are only magnificent projects. Measures prohibitory of importation, adopted under proper modifications and regulations, may have a good effect, when there is a progressive advance of industry and prosperity in a country. For, it is clear, that there must be disposable, or at least spare, capitals, in order to ameliorate agriculture, and for the cultivation of natural productions ; but there is nothing of this kind in France. But when the maritime cities, formerly so opulent, are

ruined by the shutting up of their harbours ; when every kind of industry is crushed by the weight of imposts ; when wars, less sparing of human lives than ever, make continual drafts upon the population, and annually carry off a great proportion of young men from useful labours ; then the sudden and general prohibition of the usual importations must lead to disagreeable results. The home manufactories, freed from all rivalry, will produce goods of a high price and bad quality ; an artificial high price will be laid upon goods of all descriptions ; but, being unable to attain their customary enjoyments, all the world will consent to privations ; the deficiencies in the consumption will diminish the receipts of the indirect imposts, and force the government to raise the tariff, or, if possible, to invent new ones ; misery and depopulation will increase in a frightful manner. Thus France, and all the countries under her regime, will be impoverished in a twinkling. Let us compare Holland, at the present day, with what it was previous to 1795 ! After all which it has suffered, its junction with France has given it the last blow of a public bankruptcy ; for this is the true name of the reduction of the national debt to one-third, not of the capital, but of interest. Eighteen years have been sufficient to dissipate the riches, accumulated by wisdom and political energy, by economy and commercial activity, during upwards of two centuries. The north of Germany, in general more distinguished for a careful cultivation than for fertility, had acquired a high degree of improvement, in consequence of enlightened administrations and a long peace. For forty years this country had not been the theatre of any war ; it remained tranquil even during those of the revolution, till 1806. The Hanseatic cities were more flourishing than ever, because commerce, expelled from Holland, took refuge there. Within the space of six years, reckoning from the Prussian war, or nine since the occupation of Hanover, the whole of the north of Germany has been turned topsy-turvy. A precise calculator has exerted himself to prove, that, in spite of the pretended prosperity

of the finances, of which Napoleon's ministers make an ostentatious parade, there is a deficit in his receipts, which he is constantly obliged to make good by military enterprizes ; not daring to diminish his military power, and not being able to keep it up with his own resources. Be the case as it may, it is certain that not only has he brought to the highest point of perfection the art of subsisting his troops at the expense of the enemy ; but, even in the intervals of peace, he scarcely permits them to return to France. The most fortunate of his allies are those through whose states his numerous armies have only occasion to pass ; other countries have the burden of providing for all their wants during a long residence. He is at all times particular in having some country in reserve to be given up to plunder until its fate be definitively settled ; when there is absolutely nothing more to extort, he then unites it to the Grand Empire, or generously gives it to some ally. The fortunate inhabitants of Sweden, who have never seen one of Buonaparte's armies inundate their country, cannot conceive how expensive his friendships have been ; every petty district of Germany can furnish melancholy details on this subject.

The obstinate partisans of Napoleon assert, that these are mere transitory evils, arising out of the resistance to his grand plans of regeneration ; that the population of Europe have nothing to do but to take arms against their ancient governments ; and, when once firmly connected with the Federal system of France, the war is removed from their frontiers ; while, under the shade of her protecting power, their losses are quickly repaired. But is there any room for breathing by the side of such indefatigable ambition ? Napoleon demands of his allies, as if they were his subjects, men and money. His demands are not proportioned to their means, but to his own wants, always urgent and always exorbitant. It forms no part of his character to husband resources ; he recognizes no future beyond his next enterprize.

The confederate princes are, therefore, obliged to have constantly on foot a military establishment beyond

all proportion to their population and revenues ; while the troops of Buonaparte live at discretion among them, they remain charged with the pay of their own troops and with all their expenses when these troops are employed in far distant wars, with which their countries have no concern ;—the contingents of every confederated state are fixed in appearance ; but what does this serve, when the will of their master is sufficient to double or triple them ? Besides, it is not stipulated that the auxiliaries shall furnish a certain number of men once for all during every war ; on the contrary, in proportion as the sword of the enemy destroys the soldiers, and the diseases of strange climates carry them off, the blanks must be filled up ; and, as he is in preference prodigal of auxiliaries, it is a gulf, the vast depth of which swallows up every thing which comes within its vortex !

As the offensive alliance between the Great Empire and states of the second and third degree is always at the expense of the latter, every thing is to the advantage of the most powerful, and the people are not permitted to have a vote in their own affairs. As a consequence, the vassal kings ought to be equally absolute among their subjects as their master is in France, but Napoleon has made them abject.

Since the age of Louis XIV. the French have been accustomed to give the law to Europe. The lustre of this reign, celebrated by arms and learning ; the universality of the French language ; the animated politeness of their manners ; every thing concurred to render to France, from all Europe, the voluntary homage of imitation. This European ascendancy become frivolous under the regency and under Louis XV. introducing every where among the great, religious and moral incredulity, as easily as changes in dress and fashion, was, nevertheless, very advantageous to the success of the revolution. France then wished to give to Europe, and to the whole world, Parisian modes in politics, and constitutions were accepted with ecstasy, because they were shaped in the modern temple of taste ! That forms of government ought to be adapted to the character, the

faculties, and the latitudes of every nation, and to the localities of every country, so that any sudden and unexpected change might produce no durable effect,—truths so evident that they struck the common sense of every one,—were misconceived by the missionaries of the revolutionary propaganda. They wished to communicate to the whole human race the benedictions of their new order, (or rather social disorder,) before they had tasted it themselves. At first, national assemblies were every where convoked; afterwards the Luxembourg Directory brought forth little Directories, Cisalpine, Batavian, and Helvetic; some time afterwards there was a President, or a Grand Pensionary nominated by the First Consul; and, finally, there is now every where an Absolute Monarchy under the Napoleon dynasty. This phenomenon was, till then, unknown in Europe; monarchies, which passed for the least limited, were, in fact, limited in a thousand ways: by the influence of the noblesse and of the clergy; by antient usages, which they durst not infringe; by the emulation of liberality, which, in the 18th century, existed in all governments; by the force of European opinion; and, finally, by the liberty of the press, which, if it were any where oppressed, took refuge in a neighbouring state. In France, the levelers, in the name of republican equality, paved the way for despotism: nothing but the throne was raised above the dust: the new prerogatives and distinctions of rank are only phantoms which their invention can annihilate. The regime of Buonaparte is generally composed of two elements: one of them revolutionary measures rendered permanent by a methodical execution; the other, the abuses of antient royalty revived and multiplied. There was once a single Bastille in France: he has erected eight: every thing is in the same proportion. The luxury of the antient court gave great offence: it was humble and modest compared with the pomp of the new! The kings of his creation have imitated him in this respect: feeling their own want of moral dignity, they think to impose on the vulgar by external pomp.

In short, the infallible consequences of the Continental System, to every state, are, the ruin of commerce and industry ; overwhelming taxes ; the overthrow of all constitutional forms ; interminable wars, on account of others, equally expensive and sanguinary ; armies estranged from their country, and all of them ready to turn their arms against their fellow-citizens ; princes, incapable of protecting, endowed with an unlimited power of oppressing their subjects, and trembling, in their turn, before their master ; finally, in the midst of terror, misery, ignominy, the obligation to erect triumphal arches, and to sing hymns of adulation.

I shall finish these pages by hazarding some reflections upon the following question : What is the safest, the most advantageous, and the most honourable part for Sweden to take under present circumstances ? I speak of *my own accord* ; for a humble individual cannot be permitted, but with extreme circumspection, to anticipate the intentions of government.

An alliance with modern France, or rather with Napoleon, carries with it the necessity of entering into all the principles of the Continental System. I do not suppose, that all which has been developed on this subject will be refuted by the hacknied adage, that France is the natural ally of Sweden. Is it now the same France, the same Sweden, the same Europe, to which this thesis applied ? Formerly, France gave subsidies ; now she exacts tributes ; formerly, France had a great naval force ; she could efficaciously support the navigation of Sweden, in the event of an attack from England. France has now no navy ; and, as soon as any power is allied with her, it runs the risk of losing its own : formerly, France was separated from Sweden by a number of states placed between them : at present they adjoin each other, for France has Denmark at her disposal : formerly, of all the powers of Europe, France was most intimately connected with the Porte ; she could by her influence make an useful diversion for Sweden, in the event of a rupture with Russia. At present, France is a frontier to Turkey, and her projects of conquest are

unequivocal. As every thing has changed, so has the meaning of the expression, *natural ally*, changed also. While any equilibrium existed, challenges were generally sent to adjoining states. Countries which were removed to such a distance as to prevent them from coming in collision, but which nevertheless could help each other indirectly, were reputed natural allies. At present, when revolutionary politics have subjugated two-thirds of the Continent, and attempt to overturn whatever still remains unshaken, all the states which are able and willing to maintain their independence, and to fortify it by the dissolution of the federal system of France, ought to unite strictly, whether they are neighbours or placed at the extremities of Europe, and whatever may be their antient relation and even their present quarrels. Rivalries, individual claims, and recrimination, ought to be forgotten, in order to labour with one common accord in a danger so urgent.

But since there are persons who think they have found, in the past, rules for their conduct at present ; since we meet with prejudices which are, as it were, petrified in the heads of those who like better to repeat the lessons received in their youth, than to observe and reflect for themselves ; let us take the trouble to examine the history of the alliances between Sweden and France, and we shall find that the former never reaped any abundant fruits. In the seventeenth century, France, in fact, contributed by subsidies to place Gustavus Adolphus I. in a condition to undertake that war which was so glorious for Sweden ; but her assistance was always hollow, the French ministry were jealous of her successes, and in the negociation for the peace of Westphalia they intrigued in every possible way to defeat the advantages which her efforts had gained. One of the most respectable Swedish politicians, Chancellor Oxenstiern, drew up, in 1692, a memoir, in which he strongly deprecates, with most judicious arguments, an alliance with France.* This was nevertheless the glorious age of Lewis XIV.

* The memoir is inserted in the *Recherches sur les alliances entre la Suede et la France*, par Rousset.

This will be sufficient to prove to our readers, that even formerly the opinion of enlightened men in Sweden has not been unanimous, as to the system which ought to be pursued towards France. But we repeat, that the circumstances in which Europe is placed are so extraordinary, that no commonplace diplomatist can meet them.

Sweden has a right to remain neutral ; but we have seen that Napoleon admits of no neutrality ; that he regards as enemies all those who do not assist him in making a negative war against England. If for the moment he cannot prevent the neutrality of a state, he will bear it in mind, and will seize the first opportunity of revenging himself, by throwing that state into such a dependent condition that it can never rise.

To hazard a wish to preserve independence, without forming positive connection with the powers coalesced against Napoleon, would be to attract his resentment. On the other hand, what must be done to satisfy him ? Shut our ports hermetically against the English; and as a consequence submit to see them blockaded ; deprive ourselves not only of the advantage of mutual exportation between Sweden and England, but of the possibility of all navigation and all external commerce ; treat as state criminals the inhabitants of states, which, for want of other resources, would attempt to resist regulations so rigorous ; diminish the revenues of the state, like those of individuals ; expose ourselves to famine in consequence of obstacles which the English can interpose to the arrival of grain from the Baltic and to the coasting-trade : these are the sacrifices which Napoleon requires from Sweden, for an indefinite time, without holding out any return except from time to time a majestic sign of approbation. These presumptuous demands are so insulting, that, laying aside all self-interest, the sentiment of national dignity alone ought to induce us to reject them.

In order to see with their own eyes what it costs a maritime power to have Napoleon for an ally, the Swedes have only to look at their neighbours, the Danes. I

have omitted to speak of the affairs of Denmark, because, in the general progress of events, they have only been of secondary importance. Much praise has been bestowed upon the neutrality which this government has professed since the commencement of the wars of the revolution. This conduct was, nevertheless, but a pitiful mercantile speculation. Sunk in profound apathy during the revolutions of Europe, Denmark had nothing in view but the momentary advantages of her commerce, without ever dreaming that the fall of so many states would soon shake the basis of her own political existence. The fact is, that Denmark, after having done a great deal of mischief to the coalesced powers, has, in the end, drawn upon herself irreparable evils. The British government, after having long tolerated a neutrality, (entirely to its disadvantage,) finally saw itself obliged to take precautions for its safety in a contest which it maintained alone against so many enemies. But it was content with disarming Denmark, by seizing her fleet; and it evacuated Zealand, already conquered, which it might easily have kept by its sea and land forces, and continued to make war against the Danes, with that moderation which it had adopted as a principle, when hostilities were committed, by less powerful states, at the instigation of France.

The king of Denmark, during the war of the empire, from 1791 to 1801, never furnished the contingent, that he was bound to do as a member of the Germanic Body. On the contrary, the Danes took the odious part of contributing to rivet the chains of Germany, by sending troops to overwhelm the unfortunate Schill. Without entering into the Rhenish confederation, the king of Denmark behaved like the princes, who engaged in that league, by annulling his own authority as duke of Holstein, by destroying the privileges of the inhabitants of that province, and by subjugating them to the absolute laws of his monarchy. Neither the abdication of its chief, the only consequence of which should have been a new election, nor the violent acts of some disloyal princes, could extinguish the Germanic empire: it did exist, it still exists, if not *de facto*, at least *de jure*, and

the time is approaching when the nation may realize its reclamations against so many scandalous usurpations.

By a blindness, similar to that of another cabinet, the Danish minister always considered the German cause as foreign and unimportant with respect to the security of the state : It was not long before he was undeceived. Since the peace of Tilsit, Napoleon reigned in the north of Germany ; nevertheless, people still flattered themselves that he reserved that part of Hanover which is next to Denmark, as an instrument of negociation with England, and which he would, perhaps, have restored at peace. This hope vanished ; the formal incorporation of Hanover carried the French empire to the frontiers of Denmark ; and, in order that his design might not be misconceived, Napoleon extended his frontiers, by a narrow neck of land, to the Baltic sea. Thus, the provinces of the Danish monarchy, which touched the Continent, the duchies of Holstein, Sleswic, and Jutland, were, in a manner, inclosed by France, having no longer any inland communication but by her permission. On the other hand, the English, blockading the shores of Denmark, after threatening a descent, and cruising in those branches of the sea which separate the different provinces, interrupted the communications even between the government and its subjects. The result of friendship with France was, for Denmark, the loss of her navy and her colonies ; the impossibility of all navigation naturally followed, or, at least, it became extremely difficult, to a state almost entirely consisting of islands or of peninsulas.

Norway is frequently exposed to famine, without there being any possibility of assisting her with the grain with which Zealand abounds ; at least she must wait until the winter passes away, which prevents English vessels from visiting her shores. This state of things has lasted upwards of five years, the finances are at the lowest ebb, and paper-money has fallen almost as low as the assignats : private individuals are ruined as well as the state. And what recompense has Denmark received from her powerful ally ? That of not having been devoured. This is no trifling favour ; but let us wait a

little. Napoleon is in no haste to seize a body which is within his grasp. If he terminate the present war successfully, what a miracle will it not require to save Denmark? If, on the contrary, the coalesced powers succeed, she runs the greatest risks, because, on the general shock, she is placed at the outposts of the French empire. Upon this last supposition, if the Danish government does not make common cause with the allies, the downfall and dismemberment of her monarchy are inevitable.

To return to Sweden, with whom an amicable alliance with England appears an indispensable requisite to secure its maritime prosperity; and which, from its geographical position, it is peculiarly calculated to enforce with every possible advantage.

At this critical period, and during the suspension of British commercial intercourse with the Continent, the British government should duly appreciate the advantages of renewing and strengthening their former ties with such states as command an extent of sea-coast. It should seek to promote navigation and commerce; and the present moment is singularly favourable for this purpose. England wants European ports and inlets; she fears no rival on the seas, where her flag flies almost always triumphant.—She is absolutely oppressed by the weight of her colonial conquests; at least, it is certain that she has made several with no other benefit than that of taking them from the enemy, as they can afford her nothing to export of which she had not already a superabundance. Why, then, does not Sweden obtain from the English government some of her colonies in return for her effectual co-operations?—Why does not her commercial system invigorate and strengthen itself, while that of Holland, of Denmark, and the Hanseatic towns are paralyzed? Why should not Sweden, situated between two seas, and intersected by numerous fine lakes, not avail herself of this advantageous position?—From time immemorial her inhabitants have been fed by the watery elements that surround, what may be termed the Scandinavian peninsula. While their ancestors viewed

the perils which encircle their dangerous coast, the floating islands of ice, and the bleak storms to which a northern climate is subject, they only laughed, because these were dangers which they were accustomed to meet in their remote expeditions, and the first mention of them in history is that of bold, intrepid navigators. Why should not the Swedes retrace the footsteps of their illustrious forefathers, qualifying at the same time that spirit of enterprize with the progress of civilization? An extensive and most brilliant perspective now opens for commercial speculations.—Let Sweden, then, hasten to avail herself of all those natural and collateral advantages of which a combination of extraordinary circumstances seems to put her in the full possession.

If Europe is raised up again, they will be before-hand : if she is condemned to remain bowed down with a rod of iron, her navigation will be annihilated with all the rest of the civilized arts and sciences. The exports from each of the subjugated harbours would be guarded with invincible Herculean pillars, impregnable even to the despotism of the conqueror ;—and while his slaves with difficulty till the ground bedewed with tears of blood, the nations which are free, such as the English and the Swedes, in security will plough the turbulent ocean as if it were extensively their inheritance.

It is not to be doubted, that whatever tends to consolidate peace and harmony, to reanimate and multiply a mutual regard between England and Sweden, should be in this last-named country alike conformable to the wants and interest of the labouring class of men ;—to their natural inclination, and, it may be said, to the moral genius of the nation at large, and to the wishes of the enlightened individual.

Let us now consider its political relation with Russia. So long as Sweden retained the transmarine provinces bordering upon that empire, there always existed a point of hostile contact between the two states. When Peter the Great laid the first stone to erect a new capital at the extremity of his vast empire, on a territory snatched from the Swedish dominions, he laid the foundation of a long struggle between these nations.—Russia had to

defend a frontier too near the seat of government not to cause her uneasiness, whenever she was obliged to carry her forces to any distance ; at present, the sea and the frozen regions form a bulwark between her and a neighbouring power often formidable. Now, that there can be no war between Russia and Sweden, actuated by motives of reciprocal security, Sweden has become, as it were, an island on that side of the coast, having nothing to fear from Russia ; hence she becomes her most natural ally, besides which both states have a common interest in the Baltic, and which has already induced them more than once to concentrate and unite their maritime strength.

We must think of repairing our losses, but not obstinately seek for that reparation exactly on the vulnerable side of the question, to maintain which has so long absorbed the greatest part of the forces of the Empire. Divided and disunited states, it is well known, do not yield their sovereign that vigour which they would do were they concentrated to a focus, and formed a whole, composed of one substance : besides this, from the necessity of keeping these possessions in a state of defence, the policy of the government becomes complicate and dependant on local circumstances. It is not enough to increase our good fortune, but infinitely more important to circumscribe its limits.—Every government should form and hold its own boundary, and which, of its nature, should be rendered very difficult if not impossible to break. It is then that it enjoys without alloy its own independence ; when it has nothing to fear in its external relations, and cannot be entangled against its will in systems contrary to its own interest.

Many states, from their geographical position, are doomed to be perpetually in collision between their neighbours on every new rupture ; but Sweden, protected even by nature, should aspire to give herself a compact and almost insular integrity ; this would invigorate her strength infinitely more than any territorial acquisition or increase of population could do. The union of Calmar, formerly brought with it a series of constraint and oppression ; but we might be surprised that, in the schisms that followed between these three

kingdoms, still represented in the armorial bearings of Sweden, the two, situate nearest the sea-coast, have not remained united ; and to consider the excuse abstractedly, without entering into details of the circumstance, it would appear merely an accidental event.

The acquisition of Norway to Sweden, the most desirable of any she could make, precisely is the one that would give to Napoleon the greatest offence, and the one to which he would least accede so long as he could oppose it. How would he ever agree to bind, in a manner never to be undone, the independence of a government already too far beyond his reach, when his chief policy consists in taking away, successively, from each state, whatever degree of independence they maintained, and compelling them to participate in foreign wars, even when in opposition to their own interest ? How would he consent to give Sweden a greater extent on the sea-coast, and thus make her more anxious to avoid hostilities with England ? Never would he have given to Sweden any other than such precarious possessions, in return for her alliance on the offensive ; while, in watching over their preservation, she would be under the necessity of abiding by his will, and of co-operating in the execution of all his designs.

The Swedes, so illustrious in history, possess an innate sentiment of dignity. The nation has chosen the best means of repairing adverse times, by calling a prince to the throne, for whom they feel admiration blended with the homage due to the sovereign. In this election we behold the dawn of a glorious day ; and attachment to Sweden, valour, and the genius of an experienced warrior, are the indispensable qualifications for the chief of an empire, tottering amidst the shocks that have engulfed so many other nations, because their princes knew not how to conduct their own subjects to the field of battle. During long and bloody wars, many generals have acquired the reputation of being *fearless of danger* ; but it is rare indeed to have been without reproach in an epoch of civil commotions. The Prince-Royal of Sweden has displayed chivalry in re-

publicanism as well as in royalty ;—France is indebted to him for having defended her in the most critical periods, long before her present ruler was distinguished, who has subsequently, by a thousand artifices, caparisoned himself with military glory.

The different countries, which were the theatres of his exploits, have praised his endeavors to soften, and mitigate, the evils of war, and relieve suffering humanity : Sweden beheld him on her shores, identify himself with her citizens by sentiments of patriotism, which no sovereign of Scandinavian blood ever surpassed. For the last two years, the king's reliance on his successor, and on the uprightness of his future plans, has powerfully contributed to the re-establishment of order in the interior of the country. Private safety is secured by a due respect paid to public order ; a spirit of moderation and unanimity presides in the assemblies of the representatives ; commerce and navigation have re-assumed their wonted activity ; and the youthful defenders of their country exercise their military talents, with fervour and zeal, under the auspices of a hero. The Swedes will follow with unlimited confidence their chief, who has devoted himself wholly to them, and they require nothing more to restore them to the brightest and most exalted situation. That energetic calmness, which secured on its base the edifice of social institutions, manifested itself also in its external relations. A style replete with dignity, justice, and moderation, resounded from the utmost corner of the north, and astonished all Europe ; already, without appearing to have acted abroad, Sweden, in the general state of affairs, has exercised an important and salutary influence. The friendship that so long subsisted between her and the Sublime Porte facilitated the conclusion of peace with Russia, though France, by every means in her power, endeavoured to prevent it. The Divan, sensible that it was its real interest to cede a part of its territory rather than to accept of any guarantee of integrity from Buonaparte, offered, as a bait, to continue the war. Great Britain and Russia are so intimately connected with each other, that any suspension of amicable intercourse between

them must be of a violent nature, and of short duration. Sweden, lying in the direct road of communication, is, as it were, the intermediate link of the chain. They both seek her friendship and respect her independence, as the surest guarantees against the continental system of subjugating the Baltic.


In the interview between the emperor Alexander and the Prince Royal of Sweden, to whom the king had confided the secrets of the state, the two nations cast all former animosities between them into oblivion for ever ; and, as the Prince Regent of England had also a representative there, the unanimity of three such magnanimous sovereigns proclaims the developement of a policy contrary to the subtilty of egotism, a conduct full of liberality, and enlightened patriotism. Hence the disasters, which I have feebly attempted to point, are not, by the assistance of Divine Providence, without a remedy. Since the commencement of our woes, never have circumstances concurred so forcibly to augur that our deliverance is near at hand. Russia, for a while, appeared overwhelmed ; and had it not been for the steady and unshaken perseverance of the emperor, supported by his devoted and heroic subjects, she must have fallen. The extravagant pretensions of the aggressor created a civil war ; it spread its ravages, like a devastating torrent, towards the east : meanwhile, Spain had scarcely time to breathe, when another Marlborough arises to re-establish the fame of British arms ; and, by his glorious victories, re-animate the enthusiastic spirit of the Spanish nation. That nation, although conquered, was never subdued. On the other hand, by her internal operations, Sweden essentially served the common cause, by keeping Buonaparte's troops and his allies at bay, on the opposite coast. Germany is awakened to revived hope, and impatient to throw off the yoke. Napoleon has actually worn out and abused his good fortune ; she alone was worth all his other adherents ; he has no friends, and his allies scarcely strive to conceal their joy when they hear of his defeats. His power resembles a colossus composed of heterogeneous metals, and its earthen feet is the hatred of the people. To-day

this gigantic idol is adored ; to-morrow it falls to the ground, and the world only views it as a fragile monument of arrogant, inordinate pride !

Nations of the continent !—Let not a false security lull you to sleep.—If he is permitted to take breath on his reverses, he will convince the world of what may still be done by subterfuge and effrontery ; his wrath will have no bounds against those who have unveiled his weakness,—the weakness of a mortal !—He !—the arbiter of destinies, the god of adulation ! ! ! What is the loss of a whole army to Buonaparte, who, to use his own expression, “has so many men at his disposal ?” It is not enough that he should have been unsuccessful in the war of annihilation, but he must be rendered incapable of waging war in future,—he must be compelled to give up his system of universal sovereignty, and every pretension incompatible with the independence of nations and the tranquillity of the world at large.

In this momentous crisis, big with the future, from which there is no appeal, many nations will undergo a serious change. It is easy to foresee the fate of those governments, under Buonaparte’s control, who pertinaciously adhere to his cause. Those who remain neuter cannot expect, that, in the conflict of so many jarring interests, they will be supported by the powers they have declined to assist, or that the latter will endanger themselves ; thence, they cannot look for a gratuitous remuneration for what, in their narrow policy, they may have lost. Those powers, who have united to serve the good cause, will be seated in the front row, and their voices will preponderate in the senate of sovereigns, in whom will be invested the mighty work of re-establishing the European constitution on a more firm and solid base. Can the Swedish nation ever cease to remember, that one of her brightest claims to fame was that advantageous peace she made at Westphalia, after a long struggle with her enemies abroad ; a peace, which for upwards of an hundred and fifty years, was considered the foundation of the rights of all the nations of Europe.

N^o 69.



N^o 69.

VOL.



S. ALOFSEN.





WERT
BOOKBINDING
Grantville, Pa.
July—Aug 1987
We're Quality Bound

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS



0 019 642 312 6